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InTroducTIon
The compliance and voluntary carbon markets are fac-ing an identity crisis. Despite minor victories following the 16th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, 
the voluntary carbon markets are attempting to grow in an uncer-
tain regulatory world where the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and 
its market mechanisms hang in the balance. At the same time, 
the voluntary carbon markets have been able to survive through 
flexibility and strong self-governance.
Critics initially attacked the fledgling voluntary market for 
its lack of conformity to rules and attentiveness to real environ-
mental action. Now, as the voluntary markets mature, stricter 
codes of conduct are emerging. Many of the almost two-dozen 
carbon offset certification standards that exist in the voluntary 
carbon markets today seek to establish credibility and account-
ability for voluntary environmental commitments. They seek to 
enforce their rules through transparency and reputation to ensure 
that these commitments are fulfilled in a real and verifiable way. 
Indeed, social and environmental product certification systems 
that include third-party auditing “are remarkable for their simi-
larity to state-based regulatory and legal systems.”1 But are the 
legal systems similar? Certainly, the successful certification 
standards have “establish[ed] their own governing systems, 
largely independent of state governments, with the regulatory 
capacity to back up those obligations with enforceable rules.”2 
But what happens when the certification standard makes a mis-
take in enforcement?
Several voluntary certification standards include dispute 
resolution mechanisms for private parties harmed by an adverse 
decision from an auditor or the standard itself during the certi-
fication process. However, these dispute resolution mechanisms 
vary widely and encompass diverse degrees and notions of due 
process rights. The available dispute resolution mechanisms in 
the voluntary carbon markets are important because they can 
serve as models for how dispute resolution will be addressed by 
the compliance markets, and, in particular, the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (“CDM”) under the Kyoto Protocol,3 which is 
currently framing its own appeals procedure for private parties.4
This article explores due process rights in the carbon mar-
kets and discusses how innovation in the voluntary markets can 
set an important example for the compliance markets. This arti-
cle provides an overview of the carbon markets and then exam-
ines whether the four leading offset certification standards in 
the voluntary carbon markets have achieved enough credibility 
and status to influence the CDM’s governance structure for the 
resolution of conflicts. Finally, it outlines the appeals procedures 
currently available in the voluntary market and advocates for 
their continued development in both the voluntary market and 
the CDM.
an overvIew oF The carbon markeTs
the compliance caRbon maRketS
There are two types of carbon markets: compliance and 
voluntary. Compliance markets are government-mandated cap-
and-trade programs. The cap-and-trade programs established by 
the Kyoto Protocol,5 the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (“EU ETS”),6 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”) in the northeastern United States7 are examples of 
compliance carbon markets. To date, the success of these mar-
kets has been mixed. Although these programs have proven that 
carbon is a viable commodity that can attract significant capital, 
several problems have repeatedly plagued these markets, includ-
ing the ability to set appropriate caps to enable real emissions 
reductions over time.8
Carbon offsets, which must be certified by a third-party cer-
tification standard, are integral to any cap-and-trade program. 
“Certification standards” are independent organizations that 
provide the guarantee that a carbon offset project has achieved 
the promised emissions reductions.9 When a project’s emissions 
reductions have been verified against a standard’s rules and 
requirements, the standard will issue the project carbon credits 
equivalent to the emission reductions achieved.10 The credits are 
then considered “certified” and the credits can either be sold or 
“retired.”11
CDM Process of Certification
The most prominent carbon offset certification standard in 
the compliance markets is the CDM. The Kyoto Protocol per-
mits Annex I Parties (developed countries) to satisfy part of their 
emissions reduction targets by using Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (“CERs”) created by registered CDM project activities.12 
The CDM is a global market-based mechanism overseen by the 
CDM Executive Board (“EB”), which facilitates the creation and 
issuance of CERs from eligible CDM project activities.13 Before 
a CDM project can begin to generate CERs, it must proceed 
through the CDM project cycle. As a preliminary matter, the 
nation hosting the CDM project must belong to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol as a non-Annex I (developing) country.14 After the project 
is designed using an approved methodology that quantifies the 
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emissions reductions, a designated operational entity (“DOE”) 
is appointed to act as an independent auditor to validate and 
subsequently request registration of the proposed CDM project 
activity.15 The DOE then submits a validation report to the EB, 
thereby confirming that certain preset requirements are met.16 
The EB then decides whether to formally accept the DOE’s rec-
ommendation and if so, it “must register CDM projects within 
eight weeks of the [DOE’s] request unless three members of the 
CDM Executive Board, or a CDM participant, require a review 
of the proposed activity.”17
Once registered, the project participants implement the 
CDM project. A second and different DOE is appointed to moni-
tor the project during implementation and to ultimately confirm 
that the project’s resulting greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions 
are real, measurable, and verifiable below an approved base-
line.18 This second DOE requests the EB to issue CERs after it 
is satisfied that the GHG reductions are “appropriate”.19 There 
is then a fifteen-day window during which time a three-member 
panel of the EB or a CDM participant can request a review of the 
DOE’s findings.20 However, “[b]ecause the scope of the review 
is limited to issues of fraud, malfeasance, or incompetence of the 
[second DOE], issuance of CER[s] by the Executive Board . . . 
is almost . . . automatic.”21 If no review is requested, the CER 
“issuance is considered final.”22
the voluntaRy caRbon maRketS
In contrast to the compliance markets, voluntary carbon 
markets do not impose a mandatory cap on greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Instead, they rely on participants’ voluntary commitments 
to reduce emissions. A unique dynamic has developed between 
these two types of markets in which the voluntary markets often 
appear to act as a test-drive for companies facing the prospect 
of the enactment of complex, and sometimes confusing, com-
pliance markets.23 Indeed, the voluntary markets buoyed the 
credibility of the overall carbon markets when the compliance 
markets were most vulnerable. This was particularly evident 
following the failures at the 15th Conference of the Parties 
(“COP15”) where regulators hesitantly noted the Copenhagen 
Accord.24 The robust growth of the voluntary markets is thus a 
logical response to the Kyoto Protocol’s complex rules, dispa-
rate enforcement and inefficiencies that have resulted in CDM 
capacity bottlenecks and slowed credit issuances.25
In the past, the voluntary markets were accessed through 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”), a voluntary but legally 
binding cap-and-trade program, or through an over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) purchase or sale. However, CCX’s emissions trading 
program shut its doors at the end of 2010.26 Consequently, OTC 
transactions will now dominate the market.
Most of the transactions in the OTC market involve offset 
credits from third-party certification standards.27 In 2008 and 
2009, more than ninety percent of the credits transacted in the 
voluntary markets were certified by a third-party standard.28 
Over the last few years, the following certification standards 
have emerged as leaders in the voluntary market: the Veri-
fied Carbon Standard (“VCS”), the Climate Action Reserve 
(“CAR”), the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”), and the Gold 
Standard (“GS”).29
The VCS was launched in 2007.30 It was founded by The 
Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Associa-
tion, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment.31 The World Economic Forum and approximately one 
thousand carbon market stakeholders also assisted in developing 
the standard.32 VCS issues credits called Verified Carbon Units 
(“VCUs”) for carbon offset projects throughout the world that 
can demonstrate emissions reductions that are real, measurable, 
permanent, additional, independently verified, unique, transpar-
ent, and conservative.33
CAR, formerly the California Climate Action Registry 
(“CCAR”), was established in 2001 after a group of CEOs lob-
bied the state of California to create a mechanism by which they 
could track their firms’ early emissions reductions in anticipa-
tion of the future state and potential federal regulation.34 CCAR 
was thus born from a state mandate.35 The program eventually 
separated from the state to be incorporated as a nonprofit orga-
nization and, in 2009, the organization began transitioning its 
tracking and inventory operations to The Climate Registry, a 
national nonprofit body established in 2007 that was actually 
modeled after CCAR.36 In turn, CAR flip-flopped its role as part 
of CCAR to become the new parent organization focusing on 
developing an offset credit, Climate Reserve Tonnes (“CRT”) 
that apply to GHG reduction projects within North America.37
ACR was established in 1996 by the Environmental Defense 
Fund and Environmental Resources Trust.38 It was the first of its 
kind in the United States and over the last fifteen years, it has 
issued over thirty million offset credits.39 These credits, called 
Emission Reduction Tons (“ERTs”), are issued in accordance 
with ACR’s requirement that reductions are “real, measurable, 
permanent, in excess of regulatory requirements and common 
practice, additional to business-as-usual, net of leakage, verified 
by a competent independent third party, and used only once.”40 
ACR’s reach is not limited to the United States and accepts 
international projects.41 In 2007, ACR became an “enterprise” 
of Winrock International, an American nonprofit organization 
working globally to “empower the disadvantaged, increase eco-
nomic opportunity, and sustain natural resources.”42
The GS Foundation, which manages the GS carbon certifi-
cation scheme, was founded in 2003 by a network of large non-
governmental organizations (“NGO”), including the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature, Helio International, and SouthSouthNorth, in 
response to criticism that the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM did not ade-
quately address sustainable development.43 These NGOs devel-
oped the GS as a complement to renewable energy or energy 
efficiency CDM projects through the addition of a sustainabil-
ity assessment.44 If a project proponent successfully applied the 
GS’s sustainability assessment to its CDM project, then the GS 
would provide the CDM project with an additional GS label.45 
The project could then sell the GS-labeled CERs for an addi-
tional premium in the marketplace.46 Subsequently, in 2006, the 
GS launched its voluntary standard whereby it issues GS Vol-
untary Emission Reductions (“VERs”) to renewable energy or 
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energy efficiency projects that successfully meet the Standard’s 
rigorous technical and sustainable development criteria.47
Unlike the CDM, which was born out of climate diplo-
macy and is therefore vulnerable to global politicking, VCS, 
CAR, ACR, and GS operate in an unregulated market, free 
from bureaucracy, political hostage-taking, and other possible 
effects of governmental intervention. This gives VCS, CAR, 
ACR, and GS freedom to respond to market demands through 
innovation, limited only by their own creativity and available 
resources. As such, these standards can experiment with a vari-
ety of governance, financial, and technical mechanisms. Indeed, 
experiments in the voluntary carbon markets—the successes and 
failures alike—can set examples for the compliance markets as 
they develop over time.
These third party standards play another critical role in the 
voluntary markets, acting as civil regulatory bodies to build con-
sumer trust by ensuring a consistent level of quality. Thus, vol-
untary certification standards become “distinctive . . . because 
they transform the global marketplace by developing ‘delib-
erative and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed 
social and environmental norms in the global marketplace that 
derive authority directly from interested audiences, includ[ing] 
those they seek to regulate, [but do not derive their authority] 
from sovereign states.’”48 Such non-state global governance 
institutions are known as non-state market driven (“NSMD”) 
governance systems.49 The application of the NSMD analysis to 
voluntary carbon certification standards is appropriate because 
the framework was originally developed to explain forest certifi-
cation, which is similar to carbon certification.50
VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS must establish credibility, build 
consumer trust, develop a strong reputation in the marketplace, 
and operate with a certain degree of political integrity to be 
considered as relevant and appropriate examples for the CDM. 
The NSMD governance system, an academic analytical frame-
work, provides a framework from within which to measure these 
characteristics.
The nsmd Framework– 
a measure oF markeT credIbIlITy
It is generally accepted that a NSMD system displays five 
features.51 First, a NSMD system’s authority is not derived 
from the state.52 That is, “there is no use of state sovereignty to 
enforce compliance.”53 This element is arguably the most impor-
tant because of the lack of a connection with the state, which dis-
tinguishes NSMD systems from public-private partnerships or, 
in the case of carbon markets, the standard-setting CDM, which 
derives its authority from an international agreement between 
nations.54 Second, NSMD systems must have established gov-
ernance mechanisms,55 whereby “NSMD institutions constitute 
governing arenas in which . . . adaptation, inclusion, and learn-
ing over time occur . . . across a wide range of stakeholders.”56 
At its core, this element rests on democratic ideals of fairness, 
accountability and transparency, and its intent is to promote 
“good practice” and “practical reason.”57 Third, the NSMD’s 
authority is market-based,58 deriving its power from the market 
and civil society.59 Fourth, the NSMD is concerned with social 
impacts.60 A NSMD governance system seeks to address global 
issues that private firms are not incentivized to address, and 
which governments may not have the capacity or, in the case 
of climate change mitigation in the United States, the political 
will to remedy.61 Finally, the NSMD system has enforcement 
mechanisms and mandatory requirements.62 These are rules and 
regulations where compliance can be verified and non-compli-
ance can be punished.63 “Once firms sign on, they are subject to 
governance, rules and enforcement that have more in common 
with state regulation than standards of voluntary bodies that can 
be abandoned with little consequence.”64
While the NSMD framework omits any express reference 
to due process rights for the NSMD system’s constituents, it is 
recognized that “entities that are affected by the decisions of a 
regulatory body [should] have access to a full and fair review of 
the decision in question.”65 If NSMD systems are akin to demo-
cratic regulatory bodies, then it would seem logical to expressly 
incorporate the protection of individual rights into the NSMD 
theoretical analysis. The exclusion of due process principles 
would appear to contravene the democratic ideals upon which 
the NSMD systems are founded and rely.
It is possible that the second element of a NSMD system, 
related to governance mechanisms, could be interpreted to 
include due process rights. Within the governance aspect, “good 
practice” is defined in terms of “fairness and procedural legiti-
macy,” but there is no consensus as to how to achieve it.66 Like-
wise, “practical reason” relates to ideas of procedural fairness.
Practical reason builds on the notion that reasons derive 
from interpretative and dialogical processes (e.g., 
legal processes) in which intersubjectively validated 
knowledge and normative understandings of fairness 
play a role. [Practical reason] . . . concerns the epis-
temic requirements for democratic practice, which . . 
. requires “discursive validation” [and] “ideal speech” 
conditions where validity claims can be assessed.67
In other words, constituents should be afforded the opportunity 
to challenge validity claims and be heard.68 “Practical reason,” 
however, is interpreted on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with specific historical context and cultural values.69
Status as a NSMD system is important as these certifica-
tion systems pursue legitimacy as civil regulatory bodies.70 
Otherwise, standards that cannot meet the NSMD test risk cat-
egorization as merely a string of coordinated activities adopted 
by self-serving stakeholders. Under the existing five-part test, 
three out of the four voluntary certification standards have the 
elements of a NSMD system and one standard, CAR, which 
has gained credibility through its connections with the State 
of California, may be more aptly described as a public-private 
partnership.
vcS
Under the five-part NSMD test, VCS meets all of the 
requirements. As an industry-created standard, its power is 
not derived from the state. It is governed by the VCS Standard 
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2007.1 and Program Guidelines 2007.1,71 which outline the 
rules and methodologies required of project developers, verifi-
ers, and validators.72 VCS meets the third element of the orig-
inal NSMD analysis because its authority is derived from the 
market. In 2009, VCS held thirty-five percent of the transaction 
volume in the voluntary market.73 VCS also meets the fourth 
and fifth NSMD elements because it is concerned with the social 
domain (its mission is climate change mitigation) and its rules 
are enforceable. The VCS Secretariat operates the Standard on a 
day-to-day basis and is responsible for, inter alia, a mechanism 
to license auditors as VCS validators and verifiers.74 In addition, 
“[t]he VCS Board reserves the right to sanction validators and 
verifiers, project proponents and registry operators based on evi-
dence of an improper procedure.”75
caR
The first NSMD prong, prohibiting the standard to have 
derived any power from the state, is where CAR falls short 
because it was created by the State of California. Despite its 
subsequent separation from the state to become an independent 
nonprofit organization, CAR is still recognized and rewarded for 
its early connection, and may thus be more appropriately cat-
egorized as a public-private partnership.76 In arguendo, suppos-
ing CAR did comply with the first NSMD prong, the standard 
would easily satisfy the remaining original requirements: CAR 
has established its own governance mechanisms with the Veri-
fication Program Manual and Climate Action Reserve Program 
Manual; its power is market-based (it had thirty-one percent 
of the voluntary market share in 2009);77 it is concerned with 
climate change, and it has instituted enforcement mechanisms 
and mandatory requirements in the form of a detailed program 
schedule and penalty structure.78
acR
Like VCS, ACR also meets the five NSMD requirements. 
First, as a standard founded and owned by NGOs, its power 
is not state-based. Second, it also has strict rules. Generally, 
ACR’s project cycle is similar to that used by VCS.79 ACR eas-
ily meets the third and fourth elements because its authority is 
market-based, with four percent of the voluntary market share, 
and its mission is also to mitigate climate change. 80 ACR’s 
rules are enforceable, but it relies primarily on domestic courts. 
The Guidelines specifically state that any legal responsibili-
ties or rights of ACR or parties involved (verifiers, proponents, 
members, etc.) are outlined in the contractual agreements they 
sign with one another.81 For example, the attestation agreement 
signed by parties seeking to become ACR-approved verifiers 
requires the parties to obtain their own liability insurance, agree 
to limit ACR’s liability, indemnify ACR, and submit any claims 
that may not otherwise be provided for in the contractual lan-
guage to the courts and laws of Arkansas.82
GS
The GS also meets the five-part NSMD test. First, like ACR, 
GS was founded by NGOs. Second, it has strict governance 
mechanisms. The Gold Standard Requirements (“GSR”) detail 
a multi-step project cycle for its voluntary standard in which the 
project proponent must first assess the eligibility of the project 
against the GS’s criteria, including strict rules regarding addi-
tionality and sustainable development.83 The third NSMD fac-
tor, requiring market-based authority, is also satisfied here. In 
2009, GS accounted for seven percent of the transaction volume 
in the voluntary market.84 Fourth, the GS mission’s concern for 
social impacts is two-fold: it seeks to promote sustainable devel-
opment and mitigate climate change through its offset projects. 
Finally, the GS rules are enforceable. The GS Terms and Condi-
tions (“GSTC”) provide that a breach of its rules may be “pros-
ecuted as a violation of [GS’s] intellectual property rights.”85 In 
addition, Section 10 of the GSTC addresses sanctions, including 
fines and/or the freezing of a GS registry account, for a violation 
of the GS’s rules.86
prIvaTe parTy dIspuTe resoluTIon  
mechanIsms In The carbon markeTs
There are several types of potential disputes that may arise 
between a private party project proponent and a certification 
standard.87 The first type involves the investment relationship.88 
Project development requires large up-front capital expenditures 
and, because certification is a time-consuming process, investors 
may not see returns for a few years. Consequently, even a slight 
delay may change the investment analysis. Second, disputes 
can arise over registration, issuance, or revocation decisions.89 
These disputes could involve a myriad of scenarios, such as 
when a standard rejects a project, revokes credits based on 
changes to the project, or where one project participant claims 
that the certification standard issued credits to the wrong party. 
Third, disagreements over bookkeeping could escalate into 
a potential dispute over, for example, an allegedly erroneous 
transfer.90 Fourth, a certification standard may invalidate credits 
where it has reason to believe the project documentation was 
fraudulent.91 Finally, disputes could arise in connection with the 
validation or verification reports from the third-party auditor on 
issues including, but not limited to, carbon quantification or the 
correct application of a methodology. A dispute could also arise 
when the certification standard accepts an allegedly defective 
validation or verification report.
Litigation may be the obvious recourse in the event of a dis-
pute between a private party project proponent and a certifica-
tion standard. However, here, litigation may be an inadequate 
mechanism for several reasons. A compliance market certifi-
cation standard, such as the Clean Development Mechanism, 
may be afforded sovereign immunity.92 In the case of a private 
certification standard, domestic court systems may not have the 
technical expertise to properly adjudicate registration, issuance, 
revocation, or auditing decisions, and hiring the appropriate 
expert witnesses can be expensive for both sides. Furthermore, 
project proponents may not reside in the same country as the 
private certification standard, and a foreign party may distrust 
the ability of a foreign court to be impartial.93 Private arbitra-
tion may be a better forum for disputes with public or private 
certification standards because it has the potential to be less time 
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consuming and less expensive than litigation, parties can select 
independent, technically qualified judges, and some arbitration 
bodies provide standing to both public and private parties.94 
More importantly, unlike potentially hostile foreign courts, a 
project proponent will not question the allegiance of an arbitra-
tor if it was involved in the selection process.95 On the other 
hand, private arbitration may not be well suited to resolve dis-
putes between project proponents and a certification standard 
because of the lack of uniform decision-making and difficulty 
for the prevailing party to enforce an award.96 Instead, an inde-
pendent internal dispute mechanism, tailored to the standard’s 
rules, could be the best forum for resolving such disputes.97
DiSpute ReSolution unDeR the cDm
The significance of the CDM lies in the way it marries the 
public and private sector. “The CDM is unique in regulating a 
market dominated by private players that depend, in the creation 
of the market’s underlying asset, on a United Nations commit-
tee, the CDM Executive Board that approves calculation meth-
ods and projects.”98 However, as the CDM grows—at the time 
of this writing, over 2,000 projects have been registered and the 
pipeline of undeveloped projects is equal or greater in size99—
questions about the CDM’s governance structure have arisen. In 
particular, the EB functions as a regulatory agency issuing deci-
sions and creating rules that have financial and legal implica-
tions for private parties.100 But, unlike many regulatory agencies 
that operate in accordance with democratic notions of good gov-
ernance, including “legality, certainty, formal equality, account-
ability, due process and access to justice,” the EB is not subject 
to the same governance controls.101 Compounding the problem, 
there is no independent tribunal for reviewing the EB’s deci-
sions and, consequently, CDM project proponents have little, if 
any, due process rights.102
DiSpute ReSolution in the voluntaRy caRbon 
maRketS
VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS have all developed their own 
frameworks for appeals. Likewise, the CDM is following suit 
in developing an appeals process and can look to the voluntary 
market for guidance.103 Understanding how the different certifi-
cation standards address due process rights may provide insight 
into how the CDM should evolve.
VCS
The VCS Program Guidelines acknowledge the possibility 
of disagreements between project proponents and the valida-
tors and verifiers empowered to certify their project under the 
VCS Standard.104 Contractual disputes under the VCS program 
involving verifiers, validators, and project participants are gen-
erally governed by English law and will be heard exclusively in 
English courts.105 The VCS Guidelines do provide “an appeal 
process for cases where project proponents feel that the vali-
dator or verifier [has] misinterpreted the VCS Program and all 
avenues of discussion with the validator or verifier have been 
exhausted.”106 In those instances, “[t]he VCS Association will 
commission an independent consultant to perform this review. 
The independent consultant will be selected by the VCS Sec-
retariat and paid for by the project proponent demanding the 
review.”107 Ultimately, though, the final decision rests with the 
VCS Board.108
CAR
CAR offers a means of recourse for parties adversely 
affected by its decisions that is tailored for the specifics of its 
program.109 For example, CAR explains that disputes between 
a verifier and project developer are to be handled by the veri-
fier’s internal procedures, but nonetheless offers itself as an 
informational resource to assist in the resolution process.110 
However, if the parties cannot reach resolution through private 
negotiation, then the parties can look to CAR to play the roles 
of judge, jury, and prosecuting attorney.111 Once the verification 
is complete, a committee of at least three CAR staff members 
will review the submitted paperwork and interview the verifiers 
and project developers involved before issuing a final, written 
determination.112
Likewise, disagreements with regard to CAR’s decisions 
affecting verifiers and project developers are also addressed 
in CAR’s Verification Guidelines.113 Upon written request for 
appeal, CAR will assemble a Dispute Resolution Committee 
containing “an odd number of individuals, including at least 
one Reserve staff member not directly involved in the case, one 
Reserve Board member, [and] a representative from an appro-
priate oversight agency—potentially . . . [a] regulatory or gov-
ernment agency—that is knowledgeable of Reserve policies and 
procedures.”114 The Dispute Resolution Committee will review 
all relevant paperwork and is authorized to consult outside 
experts.115 A decision is reached by majority vote and is consid-
ered final and not appealable.116
ACR
ACR, unlike its aforementioned counterparts, does not 
detail any appeal process in its Program Guidelines and although 
the framework for the program provides project developers 
opportunities to resolve issues discovered in the verification 
process, there is no express recourse in the event of a material 
disagreement or breakdown of communication.117 Instead, as 
discussed above, ACR relies primarily on domestic courts for 
dispute resolution.
GS
GS also provides an appeals process that protects constitu-
ents’ due process rights in a manner akin to traditional govern-
mental regulatory bodies. In July 2010, GS released a proposal 
for an appeals procedure to provide project developers with 
recourse against adverse decisions by GS regarding registration, 
issuance, or labeling.118 The purpose of the appeals procedure is 
to “fill the gap in remedies between the decisions from the certifi-
cation standard and the consequences for project developers.”119 
It is the first of its kind in the voluntary carbon markets.120
Although the GS appeals process is in its pilot phase, it is 
currently the most developed dispute resolution mechanism in 
the voluntary carbon markets. If successful, it can serve as an 
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example for other certification standards—both in the compli-
ance and voluntary markets—that do not currently afford their 
project proponents the same level of independent review.
The GS Rules for Appeals on Registration, Issuance and 
Labeling (“Arbitration Rules”), which are based on the Interna-
tional Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (“PCA”) 
“Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Envi-
ronment and/or Natural Resources,” (“Environmental Rules”), 
will govern the arbitration procedure.121 Created in 2001, the 
Environmental Rules fill a gap in international environmental 
dispute resolution by providing a forum in which governments, 
NGOs, private entities, and individuals can seek redress.122 Cer-
tain changes have been made to the Environmental Rules to 
account for the particular characteristics of GS projects and the 
GS project cycle.123
Initially, the scope of the proposed appellate procedure would 
be limited to project proponents, project applicants, and project 
owners.124 These parties would be required to submit their dis-
agreement with a GS decision to mediation within six weeks.125 
If the mediation proves unsuccessful, the parties would have the 
option to appeal the dispute to the PCA at the Peace Palace in 
The Hague, who will serve as the registrar of proceedings and will 
channel communications between or among the parties.126
In accordance with the GS Arbitration Rules, the parties will 
have the option to choose one arbitrator or a tribunal of three 
arbitrators, with opportunities to challenge the appointment 
of an arbitrator on various grounds.127 The arbitrators will be 
appointed from a list of specialized arbitrators to be created and 
maintained by a neutral appointing committee.128 Hearings may 
be held in person, or via telecommunication and parties may call 
experts to provide evidence during the hearings.129
With regard to the award, the purpose of the arbitration pro-
cedure is not to award damages or pecuniary compensation.130 
Rather, the award will determine whether the adverse decision 
was well-founded and in accordance with the relevant version 
of the GSRs.131  If it is determined that the adverse decision was 
not well-founded or it violated the relevant GSRs, the arbitra-
tion tribunal may issue an alternative decision or provide for an 
alternative action.132 
conclusIon
The right to due process is fundamental to democratic ide-
als and governance systems. As the compliance markets and, in 
particular, the CDM, evolve, they will likely seek to incorpo-
rate mechanisms to protect individual procedural rights. Those 
best positioned to play the part of role model are CAR, ACR, 
VCS, and GS, having all achieved a level of market credibility 
measured by the NSMD framework. However, the appeals pro-
cedures provided for by these four standards vary widely. The 
voluntary carbon markets, and the offset certification standards 
that operate within them, are gaining credibility and can set the 
tone for the compliance markets.
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